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1
INTRODUCTION
THE ROLE OF MENA BUSINESS IN POLICY MAKING 
AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
Steffen Hertog
This book is the result of a project on Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) business politics that started in 2008. At the time, the leading 
topic for political scientists working on MENA was the enduring author-
itarianism of the Arab world, a region bypassed by successive interna-
tional waves of democratization. Some authors saw “crony capitalism”— 
tight, informal and exclusive networks between leading regime actors 
and select capitalists—as a pivotal ingredient of authoritarian stability.1
 From the outset, the editors of this volume were less concerned with 
macro-questions like the impact of business on authoritarian survival. 
We instead focused on understanding the little-documented politics of 
MENA business in its own right: How have the increased capacities of 
MENA businesses shaped their negotiation stances vis-à-vis regimes? 
How do the resulting state-business relations affect economic policy 
decisions and outcomes, and through which formal and informal chan-
nels are these relations conducted? How are the social roots of different 
sections of business reflected in their relations with the region’s regimes?
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 After the tumultuous events of 2011 and 2012, explaining Arab 
authoritarian survival is less topical—and it turned out that at least in 
several Arab republics, business cronyism was not enough to keep vet-
eran dictators in place. At the same time, understanding capacities and 
motivations of MENA businesses and their relationship to the state, 
both individually and collectively, has become more important than ever.
 As “crony capitalist” theories would predict, business appears to have 
been marginal in the region’s uprisings. Yet most of the regimes in the 
region, whether old or new, face a potential fiscal and employment crisis, 
unfolding against the background of heightened popular expectations 
and weak administrative apparatuses. MENA regimes will inevitably 
have to rely on local capitalists to provide public services and combat 
widespread un- and underemployment. The legacies of business politics 
analyzed in this volume will have a strong impact on the possibilities and 
limits of such mobilization and the attendant bargaining processes.
 The countries included in the chapters of this volume are Egypt, 
Syria, Iran, Kuwait, the UAE, and—in the shape of a statistical survey—
the other four GCC countries. The individual topics of the country case 
studies vary, spanning issues as diverse as economic policy-making, the 
role of business in civil society, and regime patronage over religious 
business elites. Yet there are several common themes that emerge from 
the book as a whole and are moreover likely to travel beyond the cases 
at hand to other countries not included as case studies, notably the 
middle-income countries Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.
 All across the region, demographic growth and the crisis of statist 
development have resulted in increasing demands on the private sector 
to contribute to national capital formation and employment, share in 
the delivery of public services and welfare, and serve as interface with 
international business and, sometimes, international organizations and 
civil society. Arab business elites have also been called on to act as politi-
cal intermediaries to represent wider social and political constituencies 
in an age of renewed social inequality and mass demobilization. At the 
same time, small strata of privileged businesses have been prominent 
recipients of regime patronage and conduits of intra-elite rent recy-
cling—not a new phenomenon in the region’s monarchies, but a novelty 
in scale and scope in the formerly socialist republics.
 While capacities and tasks have shifted between state and business, 
the relationship has remained lopsided. As formal corporatist institu-
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tions of interest representation are often empty husks, state-business 
negotiations have frequently remained informal and purely reactive, 
with the vast majority of businesses excluded from them. Modern 
business-supported “civil society” organizations have often done the 
regime’s bidding, operated primarily for an international audience, and 
developed limited resonance in local society. Levels of trust between 
state and business below the top echelon have remained low. The deep 
formal and informal involvement of the state in Arab economies has 
deformed and fragmented the capitalist class, a class which regimes have 
utilized for patronage, rent-seeking and façade modernization at least as 
much as for meaningful diversification and development.
 The remainder of this chapter will spell out these cross-cutting themes 
in more detail, drawing on the contributions in this volume as well as 
available wider literature. It will elaborate how republican and monar-
chical business classes have remained somewhat distinct, with the latter 
enjoying a more accepted and secure—though not independent—social 
status and a relatively reduced need to operate in the shadows and 
engage in blatant corruption. It will then put the weak role of Arab 
business in the recent uprisings into international comparative perspec-
tive and conclude with some observations about the potential future role 
of Arab business in the post-revolutionary age against the background 
of its complex legacy.
A universally growing need for business capacities
Since at least the 1980s, Arab regimes have increasingly relied on the 
private sector as a driver of economic growth and job creation. Outside 
the rich and sparsely populated GCC countries, state-provided job guar-
antees have been increasingly thinned out while the quality of public 
services such as education has increasingly declined, leading to the emer-
gence—by default rather than by design—of private providers for the 
minority of consumers able to pay the requisite fees. Public industry in 
the region’s low- to middle-income countries turned out to be loss-
making and unsustainable. Its expansion stopped and enterprises in the 
more economically liberal regimes were slated for privatization.2 Bureau-
cracy in most MENA countries gets bad scores on international “govern-
ance” indicators and is often seen as a hindrance to development rather 
than the driver it was once supposed to be.3
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 While the direct role of the state in the economy in many cases 
increased into the 1970s, since then government consumption as a share 
of GDP has been on a downward trend across most of the region. Pri-
vate enterprise has come to be present in many sectors traditionally 
dominated by public entities, including strategic areas like banking, 
heavy industry and utilities. While it remains largely focused on low-
technology production, it has taken over a much larger share of the 
economy from the state.4
 Even in the GCC, where the material pressures towards private-led 
development have been less acute, regimes have left increasing room for 
private players as part of their diversification and public service delivery 
strategies from the 1990s on.
 The chapter by Hodson in this volume provides detailed and impres-
sive data demonstrating the increased role of Gulf business in local capi-
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tal formation and financial market development, its reduced dependence 
on state spending, and its leading role in regional investment.
 All across the region, policy reforms have led to a superficial conver-
gence of economic strategies and regulatory regimes on global capitalist 
standards, which has meant a significant turnaround particularly in the 
republics with a heavy statist legacy. Most economic sectors are now 
open to private local and foreign investment, trade has been liberalized, 
the share of the public sector in total employment has declined, and 
populist social and political institutions supporting workers and peas-
ants have been progressively hollowed out.5
 Even for formerly socialist Syria, Selvik in this volume documents the 
local “private sector’s newfound status as ‘development partner’ for the 
Syrian state”, reflecting a grudging but fundamental ideological reorien-
tation, and a secular shift in capacities between state and business. 
Among the region’s authoritarian systems, Iran’s alone remains enscon-
ced in the old populist, statist and “third worldist” paradigm, even if, as 
Harris shows in this volume, much of the Iranian system is a product of 
historical exigency rather than ideology.
 A new role for business does not mean new business players: barriers 
against entry to MENA markets are traditionally high,6 and as several of 
the chapters in this volume show, private networks and family conglom-
erates have dominated high-level state-business interaction in both 
monarchies and republics. Many leading capitalists across the MENA 
Graph 2: Share of government consumption in GDP, GCC.
Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
19
60
19
63
19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
02
20
05
20
08
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
BUSINESS POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
6
region have their origins as rentiers or fixers for senior regime actors.7 
Yet, as Luciani’s concluding chapter argues, an important proportion of 
them have come to operate more serious and sometimes international-
ized businesses over time.8
Continuing co-optation and top-down orchestration of business politics
Do a larger capacity and a more visible role amount to a more serious 
role for business in economic policy-making? On the formal level, the 
evidence for this is weak. Business is mostly organized through corporat-
ist, state-licensed mechanisms of interest representation, including both 
traditional chambers of commerce and new elite business clubs and 
groups, all of which are usually dominated by large players close to 
power (see the chapters of Zintl and Selvik on Syria, Springborg on 
Egypt, and Valeri on Bahrain and Oman). As Zovighian’s chapter shows, 
even an SME interest group organized with aid from foreign donors in 
Egypt quickly became part of the state-controlled corporatist system in 
which it was granted a monopoly position but came under increasing 
administrative control.
 The influence of formal business organizations on policy outcomes 
appears to remain limited. As Almezaini’s chapter on the UAE and 
Valeri’s chapter on Bahrain and Oman show, lobbying tends to focus on 
defending existing privileges rather than engaging with policy problems 
in a proactive way. Across the region, there are few exceptions to this 
rule.9 More broadly, deep and unaccountable state intervention tends to 
lead to individual deals between business and regime players instead of 
collective action, a process that has also been documented for Latin 
American cases.10
 On the informal level too, co-optation rather than an even-handed 
relationship seems to characterize state-business relations. As Azoulay’s 
chapter demonstrates, this is the case even in semi-democratic countries 
like Kuwait that enjoy a deep tradition of merchant politics. The only 
partial exception to this lopsided relationship appears to be Oman, 
documented in Valeri’s chapter, where a limited number of merchant 
families around the Sultan have gained control over strategic parts of 
government—a unique situation in which neither an omnipresent secu-
rity apparatus nor an extensive ruling family has been able to control the 
levers of power and distribution.
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Façade civil society and the role of business elite in it
The vast majority of Arab businesses are de facto excluded from sectoral 
interest group politics. The same is true of “civil society” activities more 
broadly, important parts of which have been under direct or indirect 
regime control. In the activities where businesses have played a role—
such as the “corporate social responsibility” agenda in Syria, documented 
by Selvik’s chapter—this has often served to project an image of liberal 
modernity to international donors and organizations. It is part of 
“authoritarian upgrading”11 rather than genuine interest group politics, 
and again follows a corporatist logic in which the regime grants monop-
oly functions to specific charities or groups. Differing from the old 
authoritarian-populist corporatism of unions and syndicates, however, 
this camouflaged corporatism is elitist and exclusionary, as it has no real 
social reach or commitment to large-scale redistribution. As with the 
SME group in Egypt, the resonance of Syria’s new, regime-endorsed 
charities among the wider business class or local society at large is strictly 
limited. And as in the Gulf, important parts of Syria’s charitable sector 
supported by business have close personal links to the ruling family, in 
particular the President’s wife.
 Zintl in this volume shows how Western-educated Syrian entrepreneurs 
with close regime connections have helped to “blue-wash” or “white-wash” 
the repressive local regime in the international arena by creating a façade 
civil society. Ironically, the “modern” elements of the Syrian bourgeoisie 
who hold Western degrees and have adopted the Western phraseology of 
civil society and corporate social responsibility appear altogether more 
likely to be cronies. Selvik shows that it is more traditional businessmen 
focusing on Islamic, zakat-based charities who are relatively independent 
of the regime and who enjoy real social legitimacy—and thereby could 
play a more prominent role in a post-Asad future.
‘Coerced charity’ and other means of delegating some public service  
and welfare provision
Stephen King has described civil society activities of business in the 
MENA’s authoritarian republics as “coerced charity”,12 a sort of stealth 
tax: as the regime’s capacity to provide welfare for the wider population 
has declined, charitable giving by capitalists is expected in return for 
continued political support, or limited interference, in their business 
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operations. In the words of one industrial manager cited by Selvik: “the 
government wants to rid itself of all kinds of responsibilities and push it 
on the private sector … it will apply the new rules of the social market 
economy to force the private sector to pay even more”.13
 Donations to charities patronized by regime members are especially 
encouraged. “Coerced charity” as a de facto means of privatizing public 
services is less of a concern in the rich GCC. Nonetheless, there can be 
considerable pressure on businesses to contribute to princely charities 
after a ruling family member has provided—often modest—seed money 
for an institution in his or her own name.14 Regime-endorsed charity 
usually reflects a hierarchical view of society: it is a top-down gesture 
rather than a result of social solidarity, and hence plays to business elites’ 
interest in underlining their privileged status.15
Successful and failed attempts to set up elite business players as social elites
While regime-endorsed civil society activity among businessmen is not 
necessarily meant to strike societal roots, there have also been some 
attempts to set up politically connected capitalists as a new social elite 
with wider power. In the colonial and early post-colonial era predating 
mass politics, much of MENA politics was conducted by elite clans 
representing and speaking on behalf of wider social communities.16 It 
seems that with their attempts to empower select businessmen as a new 
political elite, some regimes in the region have attempted to resuscitate 
such a stratum of “notables”.
 These attempts have met with very mixed success. Gamal Mubarak in 
Egypt tried to position businessmen clients of his as new power brokers 
in Parliament and the National Democratic Party, gambling on their 
(relatively) autonomous material resources and local power as landlords 
or factory owners. In fact, many businessmen candidates failed in the 
elections and the NDP had to reintegrate into its parliamentary group 
old party strongmen or non-NDP businessmen who had run as inde-
pendents with better entrenched (if also often declining) networks of 
local patronage.
 As Zintl shows, even in previously anti-bourgeois Syria, a considera-
ble number of businessmen were allowed to enter Parliament under 
Bashar. But here too, their performance has been lacklustre and has 
focused on their individual agendas more than representing a cohesive 
group with autonomous political resources.
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 As Springborg describes, the supposedly powerful Egyptian crony 
business elite was sidelined and in several cases publicly sacrificed by the 
military apparatus early on in the revolution. Crony capitalists in Syria 
and Tunisia have been even more closely linked to the ruling circles, and 
have played no independent role in a domestic struggle where the presi-
dents and security agencies have determined regime strategy.
 During the uprisings, the crony bourgeoisies have proved weaker and 
more fragmented than many analysts of the new “neo-liberal” MENA 
authoritarianism had thought. Economically liberalizing republics like 
Egypt, Syria and Tunisia had come to rely on small coteries of business 
clients that were not representative of the capitalist class at large, main-
tained a small social basis and remained at the whim of the presidential 
family or the security sector.
 While most other businesspeople did not engage in opposition, nei-
ther were they loyal supporters of the regime—instead, many tried to 
remain as independent as possible by staying clear of politics like Syria’s 
conservative, zakat-paying entrepreneurs. The fragmentation of the busi-
ness class—discussed in more detail in Luciani’s concluding chapter—
has been accentuated by the “missing middle”,17 that is, the weak 
presence of middle-sized companies that could have either given the 
regimes a broader basis or served as an organized pillar of opposition.
 MENA monarchies have a longer history of economic openness and 
deeper traditions of integrating business elites into their ruling coali-
tions,18 sometimes going back centuries as in Kuwait or Morocco. While 
republican cronies often appeared out of nowhere after the anti-bour-
geois policies of the populist era were reversed, there is more of a tradi-
tion of “politics of notables” in the region’s monarchies. Of course their 
origins, albeit going further back in time, are sometimes as “crony” as 
those of their younger republican peers. Monarchical regimes moreover 
remain perfectly capable of creating new business elites ex nihilo, as 
individual examples from Kuwait and Bahrain in this volume demon-
strate. But many of the large business clans have deeper social roots and 
status in the monarchies.
 While business and especially state-business transactions remain per-
sonalized across the whole region, the whiff of corruption is worse in the 
republics.19 Ironically, the more egalitarian and statist legacy of an earlier 
age seems to have brought out the very worst of capitalism in the age of 
liberalization, having undermined legitimate business and pushed trans-
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actions into the shadows, dependent on omnipresent state networks. 
Springborg’s chapter shows how even in Egypt, a country with a long 
pre-Nasserist history of capitalist development, the historical legitimacy 
of Egyptian business remains limited. In populist Iran, as shown in 
Harris’ chapter, business is particularly marginalized; corrupt deals are 
not even transacted through private sector lackeys, but remain largely 
within the fragmented state apparatus.
 Most capitalists’ levels of trust vis-à-vis the state have been corre-
spondingly low in the republics, as is vividly illustrated in the chapters 
on Syria and Iran in this volume. In the monarchies, links and coopera-
tion between the state and “old money” are closer, as both the UAE and 
Kuwaiti case studies show. The state acts more predictably towards a 
larger stratum of established businesses. While there are serious corrup-
tion problems in the monarchies as well, and no large business player 
can thrive if he (or, rarely, she) draws the ire of the rulers, many of the 
senior players are less dependent on individual patrons in the regime.
 While business elites have a more solid social standing in the monar-
chies, their political status is less clear. Their function as “notables” rep-
resenting larger social strata has also eroded as a larger and more 
educated middle class has started to get politically organized. While 
landowning notables remain powerful in the Moroccan countryside,20 
the propertied urban elites’ clout has been eroding, and business cronies 
around the King have drawn the ire of protestors.21
 Azoulay’s chapter describes how members of Kuwait’s ruling family 
have managed to create a number of Shi‘i business notables almost from 
scratch in the 2000s. The then Prime Minister successfully deployed 
these new intermediaries to defuse political conflicts on behalf of the 
wider Shi‘i community in Kuwait, drawing on both deep pockets and a 
long tradition of elite clans that allowed the regime to dress up an essen-
tially modern, neo-patrimonial strategy in traditional garb. Even in 
Kuwait, however, this strategy has been contingent on the minority sta-
tus of the Shi‘i and seems to have run into trouble in the wake of middle 
class protests against regime corruption. Big Sunni merchant families in 
Kuwait continue to be socially respected, but have little political clout 
and have been marginalized in parliament since the 1970s.
 The role of large business clans in the even quieter UAE, analyzed in 
Almezaini’s chapter, is closer to that of true notables, as they are both 
business and social elites, well represented in government and respected 
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in local communities. The UAE however is a regional outlier in terms of 
extremely high per capita rents, low levels of political mobilization and 
an atomized civil society. Even in traditionally quiescent but less rich 
Oman, the Sultan had to get rid of a number of ministers from estab-
lished business families when young protestors called for an end to high-
level corruption in the Sultanate in 2011. Only Qatar—not represented 
in this volume—has comparable social and economic structures to the 
UAE; but there, the ruling family is more dominant in business.
 Aside from the small and rich GCC autocracies—and to a lesser 
extent Morocco—the age of notables is over and attempts to reinsert 
businessmen into politics as a substitute for an eroding working and 
middle class constituency have not worked out. The Arab uprisings have 
shown that the age of mass politics is not congenial to indirect rule by 
propertied elites, not even in traditional political systems. And even 
when business elites have social influence, this often remains tied up 
with sectarian or ethnic identities—both in monarchies like Bahrain and 
Kuwait and in republics like Syria and Lebanon—undermining the 
private sector’s political role as national bourgeoisie.
 Both in business and in their relations with regime elites, Arab capi-
talists have gained much strength on an individual level. But this has not 
translated into capacity for independent collective action.22 The largest 
and most visible business organizations often serve no purpose and/or 
do the regime’s bidding, and other forms of business-financed civil soci-
ety activity have either been subdued and kept on a small level, or 
become part of a regime-orchestrated strategy of façade liberalization. 
Attempts to integrate business clients into the political elite seem to 
have weakened rather than strengthened the latter, particularly in the 
Arab republics.
Why was business absent in Arab political transitions?
It is not surprising that business seems to have played no organized role 
in the political revolts and transitions across the region.23 While some 
brave individual businessmen signed political petitions or joined illegal 
parties in Arab countries even before the uprisings, they did so on an 
individual basis, not as the representatives of a broader class constitu-
ency. Similarly, the young Egyptian entrepreneurs—often active in the 
IT sector—who joined the movements in Tahrir Square are perhaps 
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better understood as members of the educated middle class than as capi-
talists.24 In Libya, though individual entrepreneurs helped finance the 
rebellion, its political leadership was in the hands of professionals.25 To 
the extent that business was visible, it was so rather as supporters of the 
ancien regime—most clearly in Bahrain, where large parts of the Sunni 
business elite allied with the more repressive parts of the Al Khalifa 
family, as Valeri’s chapter shows.
 Looking at a variety of developing world case studies including Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt, Eva Bellin has argued that a tradition of state spon-
sorship and state dependence of business accounts for the absence of 
democratizing bourgeoisies in late developers worldwide.26 There have 
indeed been “dependent” bourgeoisies in many regions, but in the Mid-
dle East the phenomenon is particularly pronounced.
 We have seen that MENA business classes are fragmented, lack 
autonomous organizational space, continue to depend on bureaucratic 
if not fiscal patronage of an arbitrary state apparatus, and have in impor-
tant parts been created by the state, the result being closed and collusive 
networks with regime elites. At least at the higher levels, MENA politi-
cal economies are a classical case of neo-patrimonialism, a system in 
which political power determines access to economic resources, not the 
other way around,27 be it through state patronage over business, as in 
most Arab states, or direct control of means of production by different 
factions of the state elite, as in Iran. While business traditions are deeper 
in the monarchies and capitalists have more autonomous social stand-
ing, the difference is one of degree: true independence from the state is 
unthinkable.
 Research on Latin American cases has shown that business tends to 
function fine within any political system as long as it has access to 
decision-making.28 This is in line with the observations from several 
cases in this book, where individualized access to the administration of 
interventionist states has sustained the allegiance of large businesses to 
local regimes. Smaller players have usually lacked such access, but had 
no organizational means to protest.
 The Arab uprisings might point to a more fundamental reason why 
business in MENA has not acted as a force for political relaxation: 
perhaps the whole notion of a democratizing bourgeoisie is problematic 
in an age of mass politics. Where European bourgeoisies pushed for 
more political participation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
INTRODUCTION
  13
they did so in the context of a limited franchise and politically demobi-
lized societies.
 In the MENA countries, by contrast, important parts of the business 
classes—including non-cronies—are concerned about the economic 
policies that mass electoral democracy might bring. In Kuwait, the Sunni 
merchant elite was the main driver of electoral politics and constitution-
alism between the 1920s and the 1960s.29 But as in most of the Arab 
world, notables and business elites lost their status as nationalist leaders 
when middle class political movements became organized and directly 
mobilized a mass constituency. Nowadays, most Kuwaiti merchants 
abhor the populist economic politics of the National Assembly, in which 
they lost most of their seats since the 1970s, and many wish their fore-
bears had never let the democratic genie out of the bottle.30
 All over the region, business has much to lose from the democratic 
game of numbers. Given the anti-crony sentiment of the Arab Spring, 
post-revolutionary populism could lead to a halt to (or reversal of ) pri-
vatization, increased labour protectionism, and a diversion of state 
resources away from infrastructure and towards consumer subsidies. 
These concerns are particularly acute in poor and unequal countries like 
Egypt or Syria, where a class compromise is harder to reach.
 Of course, business in the developing world has not been anti-demo-
cratic everywhere. Capitalists in the modern world do not start rebel-
lions, but in several mid-income countries in Asia and Latin America, 
well organized business elites have tipped the balance, once a regime 
crisis has set in, by collectively defecting from the regime and providing 
organized backing for the opposition.31 Capitalists in these cases have 
tended to be more coherent, autonomous, socially legitimate, and often 
export-oriented than MENA business has been to date.
 MENA opposition forces seem to have received little organized backing 
from business in either the quick or the slow transitions that started in 
2011. As this chapter is written, the conservative bourgeoisie in Syria still 
straddles the fence of the protracted domestic conflict, although many old 
families detest the regime and seem to think in private that Asad’s days are 
numbered.32 In June 2012, Syrian businessmen set up a Doha-based fund 
to support the opposition, but this happened more than a year after the 
start of the uprising and represents capital in exile rather than local busi-
ness.33 The most daring collective act inside the country seems to have 
involved Damascus shopkeepers in some areas closing their shutters to 
protest against the regime’s violence in the summer of 2012.34
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 While the contribution to regime change appears to have been mod-
est, prominent businessmen in Egypt and Tunisia started to back a vari-
ety of parties once it became obvious that free elections were under way. 
New parties created by businessmen have however not fared well in 
either country, indicating limited social legitimacy.35 Important members 
of the business elite appear to hope for a counter-revolution: the presi-
dential candidate of the ancien regime, Ahmed Shafik, was applau ded 
enthusiastically at the elite, regime-sponsored American Chamber of 
Commerce in Egypt in May 2012 when calling Mubarak a role model.36
 The middle-sized “Islamic bourgeoisie” that is perceived to back the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt might be the closest to an autonomous, 
organized and pro-democratic group of capitalists with wider social 
backing. In the 2010 edition of Globalization and the Politics of Develop-
ment in the Middle East, Henry and Springborg place much hope on the 
region’s Islamic bourgeoisie as the potential backbone of a conservative, 
but economically open and politically plural Middle East.37
 Yet, much of this bourgeoisie still operates on a small scale and often 
on an informal basis, and the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and elsewhere 
are led by professionals rather than businessmen. Small scale and infor-
mality have often been a stratagem to avoid predation by MENA state 
elites; under a new political dispensation, there might be more scope for 
growth in scale, modern corporate structures and political visibility.
 The democratic commitment of the Islamic bourgeoisie, however, still 
has to be put to the test. Hopeful commentators draw analogies with the 
Turkish AKP and the backing it receives from a conservative Anatolian 
business class, but Turkey has a much longer history of democratic com-
petition into which its Islamists have been gradually socialized. Khairat 
al-Shater, a businessman and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s 
would-be presidential candidate in the spring of 2012, has publicly 
taken pro-market and pro-free trade positions, but seems to have a dis-
tinctly authoritarian take on the Brotherhood’s internal politics.38
 The future direction of MENA business as an organized political 
player cannot be predicted with any precision. What we do know with 
more certainty after the first wave of Arab uprisings is that organized 
business backing was not a major factor in regime change—which is 
different from what some of the international transitology literature 
might have made us expect.39 In line with this, Kurzman and Leahey 
have argued in their international study of early and late twentieth cen-
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tury democratizations that the role of the educated middle class appears 
to have been more important.40
Future roles
Looking at the non-MENA literature about the developmental and 
political roles played by bourgeoisies in the developing world, MENA 
capitalists tend to stand out in terms of what they do not do: with some 
notable exceptions, they are not export-oriented, do not engage in close 
policy coordination with the state, along the lines of Peter Evans’ 
“embedded autonomy”,41 generally have limited collective lobbying and 
self-regulation capacities,42 and have lacked a coherent political, let alone 
democratic agenda. Instead, they have been engaged in low-tech pro-
duction, have been cronyist at the top and marginalized below, and 
much of their formal politics and civil society involvement has been 
orchestrated by local regimes.
 We now know that in the republics in particular, this orchestration 
has not been very effective: the more outward-looking business cronies 
have given regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia some sheen of moderni-
zation, especially vis-à-vis international audiences. But by building 
crony capitalism, regimes had also thrown in their lot with allies that 
were small in number and socially discredited. In the face of visible 
top-level corruption, rising inequality, and the erosion of old lower and 
middle class constituencies, this seems to have rendered the regimes 
fragile. While large capitalists are more of an “organic” elite in the mon-
archies, high-level cronies have come under fire there, too.
 The private sector’s larger share in the economy and its gradual 
assumption of previously public functions tell us little about the quality 
of business activities either economically or politically. Yet, all problem-
atic historical baggage notwithstanding, the need for business capacities 
is only set to grow across the region and has become all the more acute 
with civil unrest, which has further strained public resources in old and 
new regimes.
 The new regimes might open a chance for a more even-handed 
accommodation between state and business, and a more level playing 
field among businesses themselves. There is much potential for growth 
of small and particularly middle-sized companies in a less predatory 
environment, from which a more coherent bourgeois politics could 
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emerge—not only among Islamists, but also among young secular 
entrepreneurs.
 Reporting from the region has raised hopes for startup funding and 
SME growth, open competition, and social and political pressure for 
cleaner business, even in the non-revolutionary states. Some MENA 
capitalists already report less fear of political interference.43
 A new generation of businesspeople could set up new or increase their 
influence in existing “independent” business associations, filling them 
with political life. As Luciani points out in his chapter, it is more useful 
to speak of several bourgeoisies rather than one. While this is likely to 
hold true in the foreseeable future, the more independent and dynamic 
segments might become more prominent after the Arab uprisings.
 This is far from a foregone conclusion, however: international experi-
ence shows that business conditions and practices do not necessarily 
improve in poor countries that experience democratic transitions. Cro-
nyism was reconfigured, but did not disappear in low-income democra-
tizers like Mexico, Indonesia and the Philippines, where state-business 
transactions have remained personalized. In fact, the temporary frag-
mentation of state power and the temptations of populist politics might 
make things worse for MENA capitalists in the coming years. Owing to 
the relationship-based nature of business even among non-cronies in 
MENA countries, it is unlikely that modern capital markets and corpo-
rate governance will qualitatively change regional capitalism any time 
soon. The shift from cronies to entrepreneurs might be under way, but 
it still has a long way to go.
